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Abstract
Corruption is a major global financial problem with billions of dollars
rendered lost or unaccountable annually. Corruption through contract
fraud is often conducted by withholding and/or altering financial infor-
mation. When such scandals are investigated by authorities, financial and
legal documents are usually altered to conceal the paper trail.
Smart contracts have emerged in recent years and appear promising
for applications such as legal contracts where transparency is critical and
of public interest. Transparency and auditability are inherent because
smart contracts execute operations on the blockchain, a distributed public
ledger.
In this paper, we propose the Minimum Hybrid Contract (MHC), with
the aim of introducing 1) auditability, 2) transparency, and 3) immutabil-
ity to the contract’s financial transactions. The MHC comprises an online
smart contract and an offline traditional legal contract. where the two are
immutably linked.
Secure peer-to-peer financial transactions, transparency, and cost ac-
counting are automated by the smart contract, and legal issues or disputes
are carried out by civil courts. The reliance on established legal processes
facilitates an appropriate adoption of smart contracts in traditional con-
tracts.
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1 Introduction
The type of financial institutions a country ought to implement has, for the
last three decades, mostly revolved around discovering and implementing the
ideal mechanisms for achieving a free-market economy. At the heart of these
debates has been the question of how a free market economy can be both secure,
accountable, transparent, and inclusive to the actors involved, with some of the
key solutions to these issues being particular financial regulations and legal
contracts. Moreover, while it is the corruption occurring in developing and
emerging economies outside the West, which gains most of the media attention,
it is essential to note that the issue of corruption is also a significant challenge
for developed countries.
To overcome the challenges of corruption and reliance on a trusted central-
ized third party, we propose supplementing the existing legal regime with smart
contracts where a smart contract supplements the legal contract. Our approach,
called the Minimum Hybrid Contract (MHC), seeks to incorporate the account-
ability and transparency of smart contracts into the realm of human judgment
and discretion.
An open-source and open access blockchain (hereby referred to as “blockchain“)
is a distributed database using a standard protocol such as Bitcoin. It is a dy-
namically updated ledger of records that is accessible for anyone that has an
Internet connection. This paper demonstrates that using blockchain technology
as a supplement can improve legal contracts. In agency theory, “moral hazard,“
and “information asymmetry“ -which are explained in detail below- are defined
as recurrent issues in contractual relationships, which this paper sets out to
overcome using blockchain technology.
The argument advanced here is that in addition to using a court for le-
gal disputes in contractual relationships, supplementing the legal contract with
blockchain as a tool for setting the rules for financial transactions provides trans-
parency, immutable transactions while also lowering the cost of conducting due
diligence and suitability assessments by lowering the cost of information sharing.
Section 3 presents a conceptual and software-architectural overview of an
MHC. It consists of a legal contract that is supplemented by a smart con-
tract. The smart contract facilitates transparent and secure transactions with
immutable records, and a civil court handles disputes at the mercy of a legal
contract between a principal and an agent.
The MHC is discussed in Section 4 as a tool for solving principal-agent
problems and solving the issue of low trust in agent-principal relationships.
The paper focuses on how an MHC is structured and discussion on how an
MHC affects the principal-agent relationship. It is argued to provide a deterrent
against financial crime.
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2 Background and related work
There have been several recent works porting traditional contracts onto blockchain
technology to remove the need for a trusted central authority and/or provide
transparency and auditability in contractual agreements [Weber et al., 2016,
Governatori et al., 2018, Molina-Jimenez et al., 2018].
Weber et al. (2016) [Weber et al., 2016] propose a hybrid on- and off-
blockchain technique integrating smart contracts into multi-party, collaborative
business processes. Lack of trust and reliance on a central authority are central
issues the approach aims to address. The on-blockchain component comprises
the process instance contract, a smart contract, which is coupled with the off-
blockchain component through a set of triggers (programs acting as an interface
between on- and off-blockchain). While sharing some architectural similarities,
the MHC we propose is different due to the way the smart and legal contracts
are linked; the digital fingerprint of the legal document is embedded in the
smart contract running on the blockchain. Furthermore, we do not replace
legal contracts, but rather supplement them with a smart contract to allow
transparency and auditability.
Governatori et al. (2018) [Governatori et al., 2018] focus on smart con-
tracts with the absence of a traditional written legal contract. In other words,
the smart contract is the legal contract, and its execution on the blockchain
implements the terms of the contract, provides auditing, facilitates financial
transactions, etc. The main contribution of the work examines the concep-
tual connection between legal and smart contracts and studies the suitability
of imperative (for example, Solidarity) versus declarative languages for smart
contracts.
Molina-Jimenez et al. (2018) [Molina-Jimenez et al., 2018] argue for a hy-
brid on- and off-blockchain approach to contractual agreements. The authors
implement a hybrid approach, but the reliance on a trusted third party remains
in the off-blockchain component of contract enforcement. This is similar to
the off-blockchain process we propose for the MHC, where courts handle legal
contract disputes.
In the Centrifuge white paper by Vogelsang et al. [et al.], a method is
proposed for non-fungible tokens (NFTs) where on-blockchain tokens refer to
off-blockchain documents. As will be apparent below, the MHC method we
propose is different as it embeds the off-blockchain document fingerprint in the
on-blockchain metadata, thereby immutably linking the two.
The evidence standard Ethereum improvement proposal number 1497[Vitello]
mentions a possible reference from a smart contract to a legal contract. This
proposal describes standards for using the Ethereum blockchain to store infor-
mation on smart contracts immutably and used it for future reference in case
of a court case so that arbitrators can accurately and fairly evaluate it.
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2.1 Contract fraud and corruption
While the examples of corruption in the developed world mentioned thus far
have been limited to the financial sector, it is essential to note that this issue
also blights other sectors. For example, fraud in the construction industry is
notable and takes the form of withholding information, misleading and altering
documents. Other malpractices, such as making payments and invoices for
materials never received is also prevalent [Heuvel, 2005, Bowen and Edwards,
2007]. For example, two surveys conducted in South Africa and Australia have
shown that deceit and misinformation are the most common types of fraud [Vee
and Skitmore, 2003].
Throughout several developed states in Europe, Danske Bank was involved
in facilitating the biggest money-laundering scheme in human history involving
$230 billion in 2019 [Milne and Winter, 2018]. The world is experiencing a “trust
crisis”, where public trust in government and corporations reached a historic low
in 2017 [Edelman, (2017] and remains relatively low in most of the world in 2019
[Barometer, (2019]. In a global survey on trust in 2017, Edelman reports that
85% of respondents indicated that they do not “trust the system”. Moreover,
only 52% of the respondents report trust in businesses [Edelman, (2017].
With regard to developing countries, the countries situated in the bottom
twentieth percentile on corruption control are also the most fragile states [Orre
and Mathisen, 2008]. States characterized by the weak central government
and political instability also experience high levels of corruption [ForeignPol-
icy, 2009]. These are often developing countries, which, according to The World
Bank and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), are esti-
mated to lose USD 20-40 billion due to corrupt practices [UNODC, 2010]. One
of the direst statistics can be seen in the estimates of the African Union, which
suggests that USD 150 billion (25% of the continent’s GDP) is lost every year
due to financial malpractices [International, 2007].
Corruption often occurs in countries rich in natural resources. When resource-
rich countries have low performance in socio-economic development or a “re-
source curse,” corruption is seen as a critical factor in explaining it [Mehlum
et al., 2006, Robinson et al., 2006, Ross, 2001].
2.2 Agency theory
This paper uses agency theory as an analytical lens to identify the symptoms of
contracts. Blockchain presents an alternative remedy to the symptom that has
blighted the world economy.
The relationship investigated in agency theory is one of the most commonly
codified and oldest codes of social interaction. Agency theory revolves around
the “principal-agent” relationship, where a “principal” hires an “agent” using
a legal contract. As the “principal”, delegates work to another, the “agent”
[Eisenhardt, 1985], with the agent thereby acting on behalf of the principal in
a particular decision problem domain [Ross, 1973].
The essence of agency theory is the study of principal-agent relationships
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such as lawyer-client, buyer-supplier, and employer-employee, to name a few
[Harris and Raviv, 1978]. The principal-agent literature intends to construct
a blueprint for an optimal contract between principal and agent. Eisenhardt
(1989) [Eisenhardt, 1989] shows that the problem domain studied in the principal-
agent relationship is where the principal and the agent have different preferences
for what the goal of the relationship is, and how much risk they are willing to
take. The agent is, for example, compensated if one party prefers to whistle-
blow when there are illegal practices in the relationship. Therefore, agency
theory assumes that the principal and agent have different goals, known as a
“goal-conflict”.
Another aspect of the principal-agent relationship, “moral hazard”, is de-
fined as the case where an agent neglects contractual responsibilities. For ex-
ample, moral hazard occurs if an employee uses company time to work on a
personal project. The employee’s tasks could be so complex that management
fails to detect that what the employee is doing on company time. The employee
(agent) violates the interests of the management (principal), and moral hazard
occurs [Eisenhardt, 1989, Holstrm, 1979].
Another critical assumption in agency theory is known as information asym-
metry, which emerges from the fact that a principal cannot monitor competen-
cies and map out the agents’ intentions beforehand. It also arises when knowl-
edge of an agent’s behavior is unclear and not deemed trustworthy. Eisenhardt
(1989) [Eisenhardt, 1989] notes that agency theory regards information as a
commodity: Information has a cost and can be purchased, and organizations
can invest in information systems to control opportunistic behavior from the
agent.
As scholars such as Razavi and Iverson [Razavi and Iverson, 2006] argued in
2006: Building a trusted network to share information increases interpersonal
information exchange in supply chains. While this issue has been highlighted in
agency theory, no optimal solutions have yet been provided. A possible expla-
nation is that the symptom was identified before blockchain was conceived by a
person or group under the pseudonym “Satoshi Nakamoto” in 2008 [Nakamoto,
2008]. With the blockchain technology making significant progress over the past
decade, models such as the MHC can be a cornerstone for increasing information
sharing.
However, several studies argue that the effect of transparency on corruption
is not absolute. In other words, transparency is a necessary but not sufficient
condition to reduce corruption. In addition to access to information, you need
an ability to process the information, and require the ability and incentives to
act on the processed information.
3 The Minimum Hybrid Contract (MHC)
An MHC consists of a smart contract and a legal contract, where the legal
contract is supplemented, not replaced, and effectively remains the same. The
smart contract facilitates safe and transparent transactions, whose records are
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immutable, while the traditional contract -and the traditional institutions that
ensure its validity- continues to take care of the required legal framework and
disputes. The outcome of this synthesis of conventional legal structures and
blockchain technology is the MHC, which aims to reduce corruption by increas-
ing transparency, information sharing, and auditability. An additional benefit
is a reduction in the cost of financial activity by replacing costly intermediaries
such as accountants, banks, and clearinghouses with automated smart contracts.
The MHC is implementable using most of the blockchains currently avail-
able. We used Ethereum for running the smart contract because it is the most
established of all Turing-complete smart contract blockchains. Ethereum also
has the most intuitive Application Programming Interface (API), most active
developer community, and very mature toolkit compared to the other options
making it easier to adopt.
We define the following steps for the implementation of the MHC:
Algorithm 3.1. Pseudo-code for Figure 1. See https://github.com/jakobsn/
MHC for implementation.
1. An MHC smart contract capable of referencing legal contracts and trans-
ferring funds is deployed.
2. A legal contract D is drafted with reference to the smart contract address.
3. Actors sign the legal contract D, which is then archived/stored in digital
format.
4. The contract fingerprint FD is generated and added to the latest trans-
action block Bk in the Ethereum blockchain. Including metadata such as
the addresses for the actors.
5. Actors in the contract can now send and receive transactions referring to
the contract through the smart contract.
6. In case of canceling the contract, both parties must use their personal
Ethereum account to unsign (deactivate) the smart contract before the
contract deactivates (see Algorithm 3.2).
The public-private key pair is used in case of creating a digital identity for
agents and principals. We illustrate the MHC architecture with the example
of the Uport app from the Swiss municipality of Zug, which puts citizens in
self-sovereign control of their identity [uPort, (2019]. A public-private key-pair
is generated for each citizen using the Uport app. Citizens can then share their
public key with the municipality, and in response, the citizen is issued digital
citizenship credentials.
The smart contract facilitates the transactions in the MHC. This makes the
transactions instantly auditable because each transaction is indistinguishable
from a receipt. Thus contractors and auditors can transparently audit the fi-
nancial performance of the contract, and if there is a dispute, the legal contract
is turned to for resolving it [Grigg, 2004].
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Algorithm 3.2. Pseudo-code MHC implementation. The following are func-
tions defined in the MHC running on the blockchain. See https://github.
com/jakobsn/MHC for implementation.
function create contract: Make a ContractStruct instance contract struct;
Push the contract struct to the contract list; Map the participants to the
contract struct; Record the contract creator and the contract id to the
blockchain event log; Record that the party creating this contract also
signs it.
function create contract signature: Sign a contract registered on the
blockchain; Once both parties have signed, the contract becomes active.
function create contract transfer: Send funds through the MHC smart
contract; Record the event of a contract transaction including the partic-
ipants, amount sent and an invoice fingerprint.
function update contract unsign: Unsign from a contract; Once both
parties have unsigned, the contract deactivates.
function read contract: Fetch the stored contract struct from the con-
tracts list
function read contract ids: Get the ids of the contracts related to an
actor
function read is actor: Check whether an actor is related to a specific
contract id
In Figure 1, illustrates the relationship between a legal contract and the
smart contract. The MHC smart contract is deployed for including the cor-
responding address in the legal contract. Further, one can imagine different
implementations of deployed MHC smart contracts. The participants choose
a suitable smart contract and define the legal contract. The next step for the
participants is to commit to the legal contract by signing it. Once the legal
contract is ready, it must be digitized. One can assume that the digital legal
contract must be taken care of as if it was the paper-contract. Since the only
way to generate the digital fingerprint (hash) is by using the digital contract.
The contract is now ready to be registered on the blockchain by using the
create contract function. The registration includes the participants’ addresses,
the contract fingerprint, and the hashing method used for this contract. The
fingerprint serves as a reference for the legal contract, and can only be generated
7
Figure 1: The basis of an MHC, a one-to-one relationship between a legal and
smart contract.
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Figure 2: A simple model of an MHC transaction using a smart contract and
public-private key pairs.
from the unmodified legal contract. When a participant creates the contract
representation, it must be signed by the opposing participant to become active.
Figure 2 shows how the MHC handles an invoice. Given the aforementioned
one-to-one relationships, the transactions in the smart contract have legal sta-
tus. When a participant wants to make an invoice for a certain amount of
cryptocurrency, the first step is to create a digital invoice. The MHC smart
contract can hash the invoice in the same fashion as the legal contract to pro-
vide a reference to the invoice. A receiver receives the invoice and a hash of it
and promptly signs it with their private key to authenticate the broadcast of the
corresponding transaction. The smart contract records the contract reference,
invoice hash, sender, receiver, and amount. When the blockchain approves the
transaction, the invoice maker receives the cryptocurrency.
The MHC can transparently unveil illegal and fraudulent behavior by audit-
ing transactions from smart contracts. When using these transactions to report
such disputes to a court for investigation, the legal contract, and actions taken
in the contractual relationship such as transactions that are being openly au-
ditable. If a court orders a financial settlement, a smart contract cannot force
a reversal of transaction because immutability is a central capability of smart
contracts. Thus a new transaction has to be undertaken. Figure 3 shows the
dispute process under the MHC.
3.1 Experimental results
The MHC smart contract has been deployed to the Ethereum Main Net to
demonstrate our use case . We used the MHC architecture and the Ethereum
programming language (Solidity) [sol, 2019] for the touring-complete Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM) [Hollander, 2019]. The smart contract contains the
9
Figure 3: A simple model of the most relevant elements of a dispute in an MHC.
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methods from the pseudo-code in Algorithm 3.1. To upload the smart contract
to Ethereum, the Truffle Command Line Interface (CLI) [tru, 2020] was used
in addition to Ethereum cryptocurrency ETH to pay transaction fees. The goal
of this experiment was to show how we achieve transparency, immutability, and
auditability using the MHC.
The implementation of the MHC smart contract now runs openly on the
Ethereum blockchain on this Ethereum address:
0xC0e817d3e3D79085175BCD83BD899A3d06BC1C8A. Anyone can use the smart
contract in that address to immutably link a legal and smart contract. See
the README.md file in the following MHC Git repository for more details:
https://github.com/jakobsn/MHC.
Through our experiments we create a legal contract representation providing
a unique fingerprint hash, this hash can only be generated with a specific file
such as a digital legal contract. The hash is immutable because once it has been
recorded on the blockchain it can never be changed. Once both participants
have signed the contract, the contract activates and an event is recorded to
the contracts event log. Events are recorded with a reference to their contract
instance whenever participants perform an action, such as a creating a contract
instance, making a contract transaction or unsigning from a contract. The
events are linked to their transaction, including additional information such as
block height, timestamp, sender and receiver. Combining the event log with
the stored contract representations, the system can be audited at any time and
provides complete transparency.
3.2 Applicability
Legislators have already begun supplementing contracts with smart contracts.
Delaware has adopted legislation authorizing smart contract ledgers for state
records and regulatory functions such as tracking liens and corporate shares
[Roberts, 2017]. Arizona introduced a law declaring that blockchain-based digi-
tal signatures are legally enforceable [Higgins, 2017], and Vermont [VermontGen-
eralAssembly, 2018] has declared that blockchain-based evidence is admissible
in court. This Suggests that blockchain, irrespective of the MHC, is increasingly
becoming an established standard for transferring value over the internet.
Legal scholar Werbach has argued that smart contracts are capable of serving
in legal compliance with and directly shape compliance with legal obligations if
integrated correctly [Werbach, 2018]. Therefore the architecture of the MHC is
outlined as it is the most revolutionary and conservative. That is because this
paper wants to make the MHC an iterative suggestion and keep the legal con-
tract intact, thus making the MHC backward compatible with all legal contracts.
In addition to that, the MHC leverages the transparent and immutable proper-
ties of the smart contract as it conducts the financial transactions. Because of
its simplicity, this paper argues that that the MHC is the hybrid architecture
regulators most likely agrees with initially.
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4 Discussion
The MHC offers transparency and immutability for financial transactions, and
the receipt for a transaction is indistinguishable from the transaction itself.
There is zero opportunity to fake receipts, and thus receipt fraud is theoretically
impossible. Using MHC’s immutable and transparent transactions for cost-
accounting can reduce the risk of illicit activity because of superior reliability
and cost-accounting.
Financial information is usually costly to obtain and flawed. The price of
information decreases when using the MHC, as there is no longer a need to
employ an auditing firm to review financial records, and there is no need to
trust the auditor and the issuer and safe keeper of the receipt. The principal can
audit the records in the MHC smart contract to prove which past transactions
that were signed using the agent’s public key-pair.
In the information asymmetry paradox by Arrow (1962) [Arrow, 1979], it
says that nobody can know what information they buy before they have it.
Therefore a buyer of information cannot know exactly what he is buying. The
MHC has the capability to prove that a particular individual or organization
conducted a immutable and transparent transaction. Information asymmetries
also arise when the knowledge of an agents behavior is unclear. Therefore mak-
ing financial behavior instantly auditable will help mitigate the information
asymmetry paradox. As in the case of complete and incomplete information,
the MHC gives the principal the capability to have full details of all financial
transactions conducted by the agent. The principal can use the MHC for bud-
geting and complete information on cost-accounting and complete information
in auditing [Eisenhardt, 1989].
In the case of a principal having incomplete information, Eisenhardt (1985)
[Eisenhardt, 1985] notes that monitoring behavior is a solution. Here the prin-
cipal can purchase information and reward them. As an MHC provides a cost
transaction system built into the transactions itself, this creates an environment
where the information is not necessarily purchased but audited of the blockchain
transaction ledger directly on the internet.
Access to information and transparency is normatively considered a human
right in democratic societies, as it is assumed to constitute a fundamental right
to be informed about government actions and the reasons for them. In practical
terms, transparency is essential for human development as it provides incentives
for inclusiveness and redistribution [Stiglitz, 1999].
To minimize moral hazard, principals incurring monitoring expenditures, for
example, the cost of using external auditors for scrutinizing financial statements.
On the other hand, agents can incur costs when purchasing an internal audit
to signal to the principal that they are acting inconsistently with the legal
contract (Adams 1994). Wallace (1980) argues that the agent’s compensation
reflects what a principal expends for monitoring an agent’s actions.
It is crucial to consider an MHC not exclusively as a financial tool but also
as a governing tool. For example, in the 1990s, Uganda surveys showed that
only 13% of education grants reached schools, and the rest was embezzled in
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the process by the local government. When the Ugandan government(Principal)
started publishing every monthly grant in district newspapers, there was a sub-
stantial effect on grants received by schools (agents). Surveyed in 2001, over
80% of the grants reached a school (agent), on average. Thus the impact of
access to information about the grants and thus agent’s rewards were positive
[Reinikka and Svensoon, 2005].
Considering that transactions in the MHC can be audited instantly and are
immutable, all financial actions of agents are transparent to the principal. Thus,
the MHC is a transparency and surveillance mechanism for financial information
such as auditing, accounting, cost accounting, and budgeting.
The MHC reduces the cost of enforcing financial transactions and auditing
in contracts and defines property rights of money using public-private key pairs
for addresses and authenticating transactions. Practises for accounting and
disclosure become automated and removes potentially corrupt personnel and
the capability to tamper with records. Regulators can trust more in market
integrity as the financial information they receive about the market is more
accurate and cannot be tampered with by corrupt actors.
To gradually test and implement the MHC financial regulators are recom-
mended to use “safe harbors” where specific activities are excluded from legal
enforcement and “regulatory sandboxes,” which is similar but regulated in time
and scale. Using these strategies regulators can collaborate effectively with
actors using MHCs [Congress, 1996].
5 Conclusion
In light of how current contracting practices and legislators globally are all
affected by systemic corruption at some level, this paper has developed an ar-
chitecture for the Minimum Hybrid Contract (MHC). The MHC is a practical
and evolutionary step for contracting using smart contracts as supplements to
legal agreements for financial transactions. Agency theory, which focused on
contractual relationships, has been used to discuss the capabilities and implica-
tions of the MHC. Finally, this paper focuses on how MHCs can affect agency
theory issues as it increases information sharing, automates cost accounting, and
can potentially mitigate moral hazard because the financial transactions in the
MHCs and immutable transactions enables more trustworthy and cost-effective
auditing.
The MHC does not place trust for financial activity in individuals and cen-
tral institutions, but instead distributes it across the user base and replacing
potentially questionable central authorities by communities of peers in the form
of peer-to-peer networks. Depending on and trusting a third-party for finan-
cial transactions is no longer needed. In the democratized context offered by
blockchain, corporations and superpowers cannot unilaterally defy the commu-
nity and break the rules of the system; thereby, the MHC can create a more
trustworthy system [Sun et al., 2016, Scott and Zachariadis, 2012].
MHC affects information asymmetries, moral hazard, and monitoring costs
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in agency theory. In light of the MHC, agency theory is most affected by
its transparent and immutable properties. Eased sharing and increased trans-
parency of financial information lower the cost of sharing information and de-
creases information asymmetries. The MHC reduces the monitoring cost of the
principal as it reduces the cost of obtaining financial information and conduct-
ing audits. The MHC provides a similar network as Razavi and Iverson (2006)
[Razavi and Iverson, 2006] calls out for in supply chains to exchange interper-
sonal information, but specifically for financial information. The MHC’s trans-
parent and immutable properties make it a deterrent against financial crime,
potentially reducing moral hazard.
Blockchain regulation strategies are needed to set forth a pathway for adopt-
ing the MHC. If blockchain is made illegal, the MHC cannot use a smart contract
as a supplement to a legal contract. The recommended strategy for pioneering
regulators is to implement safe harbors and regulatory sandboxes where specific
blockchain-related activities are excluded from legal obligations.
To utilize the MHC for societal well-being finding a golden middle way be-
tween private and transparent transactions is essential, and striking a balance
must between transparency and the basic human need for privacy and secrets
[Harari, 2019] is essential. “Satoshi Nakamoto” (2008) [Nakamoto, 2008] in-
vented a way to conduct open, borderless, censorship-resistant, and neutral
transactions without having to trust any corruptible central authority is a game-
changer for making contracts more trustworthy, and will most definitely affect
all of finance. Since blockchain transactions are transparent, with immutable
properties, it is also more trustworthy and makes auditing more cost-effective.
Ultimately it succeeds in mitigating moral hazard, information asymmetries,
and monitoring costs emphasized by agency theory. Because of regulatory un-
certainty around blockchain, the authors recommend regulatory strategies such
as sandboxes and safe harbors for implementing the MHC cautiously.
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